Collective Bargaining and Job Benefits in Florida Municipal Police Agencies, 2000-2009 by Doerner, William M. & Doerner, William G.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Collective Bargaining and Job Benefits in
Florida Municipal Police Agencies,
2000-2009
William M. Doerner and William G. Doerner
Florida State University, Department of Economics, Florida State
University, College of Criminology & Criminal Justice
January 2011
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/86548/
MPRA Paper No. 86548, posted 9 May 2018 04:09 UTC
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND JOB BENEFITS 
 
IN FLORIDA MUNICIPAL POLICE AGENCIES, 2000–2009 
 
 
by 
 
 
William M. Doerner 
Department of Economics 
Florida State University 
Tallahassee, FL 32306-2180 
wmdoerner@fsu.edu 
 
 
and 
 
 
William G. Doerner 
College of Criminology & Criminal Justice 
Florida State University 
Tallahassee, FL 322306-1127 
Phone: 850-644-7372 
Fax: 850-644-9614 
wdoerner@fsu.edu 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND JOB CONDITIONS 
 
IN FLORIDA MUNICIPAL POLICE AGENCIES, 2000–2009 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
While a recent analysis of unionization among Florida county sheriff deputies was informative, 
that study failed to provide a comprehensive picture of all law enforcement unionization activity 
in that state.  More specifically, county sheriff offices account for only 20% of all local law 
enforcement agencies in the state, represent approximately half the sworn personnel in Florida, 
and have only been engaged in collective bargaining for the past ten years.  As a result, the 
present study incorporates municipal police agencies, a hitherto neglected portion of the Florida 
law enforcement community, in an effort to gain a fuller understanding of how unionization 
influences salaries and other job conditions.  The results underscore the importance of adopting a 
broader orientation to understand the progression of collective bargaining objectives.  
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Introduction 
Public employee unions, including police labor groups, were catapulted into the political 
limelight recently.  Some lawmakers have blamed these employee organizations for the woeful 
budgetary conditions that many beleaguered local and state governments are facing.  As a result 
of this orientation, various proposals to rein in unions, slash public employee salaries, reduce 
government pensions, and restrict collective bargaining activities have surfaced in such places as 
Florida, Indiana, Minnesota, New Jersey, Ohio, and Wisconsin.  The ostensible hope is that 
reducing union influence will help counterbalance shrinking governmental revenues and control 
expenditures. 
Several years ago when economic conditions were much more benign, the Florida 
Supreme Court ruled that sheriff deputies had the unrestricted constitutional right to engage in 
collective bargaining (Coastal Florida Police Benevolent Association, Inc. v. Phillip B. (Phil) 
Williams, 2003).  That decision ignited a flurry of union activity.  By the end of 2008, 28 
agencies representing over three-quarters of all Florida sheriff deputies were covered by 
collective bargaining agreements (CBAs). 
That chain of events prompted Doerner and Doerner (2010) to analyze how this court 
case impacted entry-level salaries and select job benefits.  Several interesting findings emerged.  
First, although unionization increased beginning salaries for sheriff deputies, this influence did 
not extend to other fringe benefits.  Second, agency size shaped the economic impact of union 
representation.  Unionization produced an appreciable pay differential in smaller agencies (less 
than 100 sworn members) compared to larger sheriff offices (SOs).  Third, union tenure, the 
number of years a CBA has been in place, played a pivotal role in molding and enhancing the 
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overall financial package agencies extended to employees.  Interestingly, past research had not 
included this novel indicator. 
While the Doerner and Doerner article (2010) represents an admirable start, it highlights 
the pressing need for a more comprehensive examination of the influence of unionization in all 
Florida law enforcement agencies.  Strictly speaking, Doerner and Doerner (2010) studied the 
impact of a single court decision and not unionization per se.1  In addition, their findings are 
constrained by at least two other factors.  First, and understandably so, municipal police 
departments were not included in the original analysis because the Coastal Florida PBA ruling 
applied only to county SOs.  Second, Florida municipal police officers have engaged in 
collective bargaining since 1968, a right that county sheriff deputies secured in 2003.   
Another way to frame the present inquiry is to look at the relative size of Florida county 
and city law enforcement agencies.  The 67 SOs employed 19,229 sworn members during 2010, 
while the 266 city police departments housed 17,536 sworn personnel (Florida Department of 
Law Enforcement, 2011).  When placed in this context, the Doerner and Doerner (2010) findings 
are restricted to statements regarding union benefits relative to 52% of the law enforcement 
personnel and 20% of the local agencies within the state of Florida. 
Extending Doerner and Doerner (2010) to city police officers targets four nagging 
concerns.  First, this endeavor incorporates a hitherto neglected portion of the local law 
enforcement community.  Second, the original study period is expanded from six to ten years.  
Third, it provides a firmer understanding of how unionization influences job conditions.  Fourth, 
such an analysis permits yet another assessment of whether the common practice of studying 
only agencies with at least 100 sworn members confounds the ensuing results. 
The Context of Police Unionization 
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Early efforts to unionize law enforcement officers ground to a halt in 1919.  The 
members of the Boston Police Department went on strike and refused to report for duty after city 
official rejected their demands for higher wages and other concessions.  Episodes of vandalism, 
looting, and other sporadic violence prompted the governor to activate the state militia.  A series 
of violent confrontations between the soldiers and the public left a handful of civilians dead and 
others injured.  Once order was restored, the striking officers were fired and the city hired 
replacements.  This action had a chilling effect for years to come. 
The dormant police labor movement was revived when President Kennedy signed an 
executive order in 1962 that allowed federal government employees to engage in collective 
bargaining (Hunter & Merritt, 2000).  That directive, along with subsequent developments, 
paved the way for public sector employees, including police officers, to unionize.  Today, it is 
estimated that 66% of all local law enforcement officers are covered by a collective bargaining 
agreement (Reaves, 2010, p. 13). 
Despite this expanded police labor activity, researchers characterize the existing literature 
as being antiquated, silent on key issues, and hampered by methodological shortcomings (Briggs, 
Zhao, Wilson, & Ren, 2008; Walker, 2008; Wilson et al., 2006; Zhao & Lovrich, 1997).  Recent 
works have described the ability to unionize and negotiate as important and inherent rights that 
can promote morale and protect special interests (Adams, 2008; Berry, O’Connor, Punch, & 
Wilson, 2008).  In other words, contrary to the period before the Boston riots, unionized police 
now believe their complaints are being heard and that collective bargaining can improve their 
work environment.  The literature implies a perception that concessions have been achieved.  
The present study examines whether unionization results in actual, quantifiable gains for police 
officers. 
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Theoretical Framework 
 The policing literature on collective bargaining is void of any graphical or mathematical 
framework that could help generate hypotheses and predict outcomes.  Although theoretical 
models cannot account for every possible situation perfectly or predict every potential outcome 
given a certain change in the minutest detail, it would be extremely helpful to have a general 
orientation that provides an underlying foundation which anchors our foray into police unionism. 
For expositive purposes, assume there are four fundamental events that portray the inner 
workings of any police organization.  First, agencies hire law enforcement officers.  Second, the 
public pays these officers to provide protective services.  Third, agencies invest in their 
personnel by providing pre-service and in-service training to the incumbents.  Finally, the normal 
ebb and flow within any organization means that members eventually exit through retirement or 
other forms of attrition and replacements move into these vacancies.  The first two events reflect 
the “job market,” the demand for officers and the supply of potential officers.  The last two 
events represent a “public security market” which determines how much money taxpayers are 
willing to pay for a certain level of services and how much value is placed on the development of 
police employees. 
The upper portion of Figure 1 displays the “job market” for police officers and the lower 
half portrays the “public security market.”   Officer demand in Panel A is expressed as an inverse 
relationship between the salary package and the number of police officers.  As remuneration 
decreases, agencies are willing to hire more officers.  The officer supply turnover has an 
opposite, positive relationship in Panel B.  As an agency grows, it increases both the total 
number of police officers and the number of new officers at a set proportion, which happens to 
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be the constant slope of the graph.  The slope is less than unity because the number of new 
officers is typically less than the number of veteran police officers. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
Turning to the “public security market” in the bottom portion of Figure 1, Panel C shows 
that a more attractive salary package is coupled with a higher valuation or expectation for 
protective services.  In places where officers earn more, the public expects departments to be 
innovative and offer a wider litany of services like public alerts, online crime mapping, 
community policing, and school resource officers.  The last panel shows how the number of new 
officers receiving training and investment is directly proportional to the value the public places 
on its protective services.  Better trained and more professional officers create more value and 
public approval lends itself to the availability of more training funds.  The intercept in the panel 
suggests that even when there are no new officers receiving any positive investment, there is still 
some value to the protective services. 
The similarities between the axes imply that one can combine these four panels by 
rotating them into different quadrants of a single graph.2  Figure 2 yields the transformation into 
an interactive police labor market.  Labels are also provided to show the relationships between 
the variables.  The top-right quadrant conveys that the total number of police officers (P) is a 
function of salary (S) in dollars, benefits (B) in days or hours off, and other economic 
determinants (E).  Demand for police officers can shift outward or inward with changes to 
department budgets, the number of police agencies, the salaries of other law enforcement 
officers, how technology influences the role of police officers, or in future expectations of 
salaries and benefits.  The top-left quadrant compares the ratio of salary and value (V) to the 
public for protective services to form a public approval factor (ρ).  The ratio can change if public 
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opinion is altered by factors such as crimes rates or community awareness of policing practices.  
The bottom-left quadrant has the value to the public expressed as a positive function of the 
number of new officers (N).  This ratio can change as the public becomes more or less receptive 
to investing in or professionalizing its police officers.  The bottom-right quadrant provides a 
turnover factor (τ) where the number of new officers is related to the total number of police 
officers.  The curve can shift with changes in how police officers utilize technology, the number 
of officers willing to work, the number of training academies or university law enforcement 
programs, or in future expectations of how much officers will earn in salaries or benefits. 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
If we impose a functional form to the relationships in the top-right and bottom-left 
panels, we can begin to solve a system of equations that provide unique equilibrium conditions 
as depicted by where the dotted lines intersect each axis.  To conduct the same exercise 
algebraically, let the functions be linear where: 
ρV =  S         (1) 
V = α + βN         (2) 
τP = N          (3) 
S = ω + φP         (4) 
is an expression of each relationship.  Combining (1) with (2) and (3) with (4) yields: 
S / ρ =  α + βN        (5) 
S = ω + φ ( N / τ)        (6) 
which can be further combined to find the first equilibrium condition that  
 N* = (ω – ρα) / (ρβ - φ/τ)       (7) 
Substituting the equilibrium number of new officers back into the other equations gives: 
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S* = ω + (φ / τ) (ω – ρα) / (ρβ - φ/τ)       (8) 
P* = (ω – ρα) / (τρβ - φ)       (9) 
V* = ω + φ (ω – ρα) / (τρβ - φ)      (10) 
These four equilibrium conditions are useful for comparative statics.  Comparative statics 
allow the extraction of meaningful information from these equations and the prior graphs when 
one shifts (increases or decreases a variable) or pivots a line (diminish the effect of a variable).  
For example, what might happen if police officers can unionize?  Unionization could lead police 
officers to unite together and bargain more effectively.  Two situations are offered to show how 
algebra and graphs can assist in the understanding of how unions might impact the police labor 
market. 
Situation 1:  Unions Bargain for an Increase in the Number of New Officers 
Unions cannot survive without support from their membership.  Unions must sign up 
officers to have bargaining power.  If existing officers oppose collective bargaining strategies, a 
union might attempt to dilute this opposition by supporting an increase in new hires.  
Algebraically, this strategy could be quantified by adding another π officers into the job market.  
In other words, the bottom-right panel in Figure 2 is affected.  There is no shift in the turnover 
factor so adding π directly into (3) alters the equations to read: 
τP + π = N         (3b) 
S = ω + φ ( N – π) / τ        (6b) 
and one can repeat the same set of exercises to solve for the first new equilibrium as 
N** = (ω – ρα – φ π / τ ) / (ρβ - φ/τ)      (7b) 
where N** > N* since π > 0 and τ > 0 but φ < 0.  In words, the equilibrium number of new 
officers increases when unions become more powerful.  Substituting back into (3b), P* will go 
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down when the increase in N* is less than π.  From (4), S* will rise because φ < 0 and P* falls.  
Finally, from (1), ρ > 1 so V* goes up with S*. 
All those algebraic changes are also shown graphically in Figure 3.  When π is positive, 
the line in the lower-right quadrant shifts down to the grayed line.  A dark gray arrow 
emphasizes the shift.  The new equilibriums are noted by where the heavier dotted gray lines 
pass through the axes and the black arrows show how the new equilibriums increase for N, S, 
and V but fall for P. 
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
Situation 2:  Unions Bargain for Minimum Wages above the Equilibrium Level 
Unions may also influence the police labor market by the changes they implement.  
Assume that the police labor market is operating efficiently so that the labor supply and demand 
are in equilibrium.  What could happen if the union and administration agree on a minimum 
salary?  If the minimum salary is below the equilibrium wage level, then nothing changes.  
However, if the minimum salary exceeds the minimum wage level, the new policy will have a 
binding effect as shown in Figure 4. 
[Insert Figure 4 about here] 
To determine what happens when a minimum salary policy is installed, draw a horizontal 
line that runs through the top-right and top left quadrants.  The minimum salary line can be used 
to find the total number of police officers that agencies would be willing to employ at that rate, 
as well as the officers who would be willing to work at that rate.  First, draw a perpendicular line 
downward to the police officers axis from where the minimum salary line intersects the officer 
demand curve in quadrant one.  Label the intersection on that axis as PD for the quantity of police 
officers agencies are willing to employ.  Second, from where the minimum salary line intersects 
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the public approval line in the top-right quadrant, draw another vertical line downward through 
the bottom-left quadrant to the other curve and, where it touches it, extend a perpendicular 
horizontal line into the bottom-right quadrant until it touches the officer supply turnover curve.  
Draw a perpendicular vertical line upward to the axis from the lower-right quadrant.  Label the 
intersection as PS for the quantity of police officers who are willing to work for the minimum 
salary line. 
Before the minimum salary was implemented, there were an equivalent number of 
officers whom agencies were willing to employ and who were willing to work so P* = PD = PS.  
This relationship is not true after the minimum salary is imposed.  Now, Figure 4 shows that PS > 
PD, which means more police officers are willing to work at that minimum salary than agencies 
are willing to employ.  Although the union negotiation has increased the minimum salary line, 
the tradeoff is an oversupply of total police officers.  This abundant supply does not take place if 
the minimum salary is non-binding, or set either at or below the equilibrium wage level of S*. 
Summary 
The takeaway from these two algebraic and graphical exercises is that unionization can 
certainly affect the police labor market.  In the first situation, unionization is predicted to 
increase the number of new officers (more union supporters), decrease the number of total police 
officers, increase the value to the public for protective services, and increase the salary and 
benefits.  In the second situation, unionization increases the salary package police officers 
receive, but also causes an oversupply of total police officers.  The results in both situations are, 
nonetheless, conditional upon the model’s assumptions.  Different functional forms, intercepts, 
and slopes (or labor elasticities) will affect the magnitudes and directions of the results.  The 
outcomes will also vary by manipulating which quadrants are affected by unions or other outside 
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forces.  Even so, this framework provides a powerful new way of thinking formally about how 
different aspects of policing relate to each other.  It also provides justification for using empirical 
methods to test the hypothesized outcome that unions should, in a variety of conditions, be 
expected to increase employee salaries and benefits. 
Methods 
Data Source 
Several years ago, the legislature directed the Florida Department of Law Enforcement 
(FDLE) to undertake a comprehensive study of salaries and benefits paid to law enforcement 
officers throughout the state (Florida Statutes, 1995, § 943.18).  That mandate also required 
FDLE to gather information about any educational requirements, training, retirement and 
pension provisions, and other forms of employee compensation.  FDLE responded to this decree 
by instituting an annual survey called the Criminal Justice Agency Report (CJAP).  Although 
CJAP became operational in 1997, an item inquiring about agency collective bargaining status 
was not added to the survey until 2000.  Hence, the years 2000 through 2009, the last year that 
data were available when the current project began, bracket the study period. 
Every October, FDLE distributes a survey to all law enforcement agencies within the 
state.  The items ask about job conditions that existed on June 30th of that year.  In many ways, 
the questionnaire resembles the Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics 
(LEMAS) survey conducted by the U.S. Department of Justice (Reaves & Hickman, 2004).  
However, there are at least four important differences between the two approaches. 
First, CJAP is administered annually, whereas LEMAS is conducted every three to four 
years.  This strategy means that CJAP is more adept at detecting organizational changes as soon 
as they occur or shortly thereafter. 
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Second, CJAP is restricted to Florida agencies; LEMAS has a national scope.  Interstate 
variation in labor law provisions is an important determinant of public employee union activity 
(Delaney, Feuille, & Hendricks, 1984; Feuille & Delaney, 1986; Ichniowski & Zax, 1991; 
Ichniowski, Freeman, & Lauer, 1989; Zax & Ichniowski, 1990).  Unfortunately, previous police 
studies ignore these influences.  Since all Florida agencies are subject to the same state public-
sector bargaining regulations, reliance upon CJAP data corrects this oversight and holds this 
source of variation constant. 
Third, LEMAS coverage includes all agencies that employ 100 or more sworn full-time 
personnel, along with a stratified sample of smaller departments.  The routine inclusion of all 
large departments enables observers to track organizational changes within these agencies from 
one survey administration to the next.  However, reliance upon a sampling strategy for the 
smaller agencies means it is conceivable that there could be a complete turnover of participants 
included in the study group from one survey administration to the next.  What this sampling 
strategy means is that while LEMAS gathers information during every administration for the 
larger agencies, it only has cross-sectional capabilities for departments with a roster of 100 or 
fewer officers.  Thus, CJAP is more conducive to a panel analysis because it tracks the exact 
same agencies year after year. 
Finally, researchers find it necessary to exclude the smaller agencies when they pool 
LEMAS data sets over time (Briggs, Zhao, Wilson, & Ren, 2008; Wilson, Zhao, Ren, & Briggs, 
2006).  Other investigators routinely include only the larger agencies when they analyze LEMAS 
data and eliminate departments with less than 100 sworn members (Wilson & Buckler, 2010).  
As Doerner and Doerner (2010) illustrate, there is a very real risk of reaching divergent 
conclusions when looking at large versus small Florida SOs.  A glance at the 2010 CJAP data 
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reveals that 18% (n = 47) of Florida’s municipal agencies employed more than 100 officers and 
48% (n = 129) contained 25 or fewer officers.  Thus, the CJAP inclusion of smaller agencies 
provides a much more balanced picture of all local police organizations operating within Florida. 
The Study Group 
There were 294 different municipal agencies that existed at some point during the 2000–
09 interval.  However, the study group is restricted to just those Florida municipal police 
agencies that operated continuously from 2000 until 2009 and that participated regularly in the 
CJAP surveys and the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) program.  A handful of agencies, primarily 
consisting of one or two full-time sworn officers, were chronic non-participants in the CJAP 
and/or the UCR programs.  They, along with agencies established after 2000 or disbanded prior 
to 2009, were excluded from the analysis.  The final study group, then, consists of the 237 city 
police departments from the state of Florida that were active throughout the entire study period. 
Dependent Variables 
Wherever possible, there was a deliberate effort to parallel the dependent variables that 
Doerner and Doerner (2010) drew upon in their analysis of Florida sheriff deputy benefits.  Six 
indicators (starting salary, the availability of a deferred retirement option program, a buy-back 
program for converting unused hours into annual leave, longevity pay, a shift differential plan, 
and a college tuition reimbursement policy) are probed to determine the influence that collective 
bargaining exerts upon employee compensation.3 
 The annual CJAP survey asks respondents to report the starting salary at which new 
officers are hired.4  The instructions that accompany the query advise respondents not to include 
performance bonuses, overtime pay, employer contributions to retirement or pension plans, any 
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insurance subsidies, the value of an agency-provided vehicle, or any other source of money.5   
These annual figures are converted into real 2009 dollars. 
 The second indicator was whether an agency offers a Deferred Retirement Option 
Program (DROP).  Employees who enter DROP are considered to have retired, although they 
continue to work for the agency.  The benefits that accumulate during this post-retirement period, 
usually a maximum of five years, are deposited into a special employee account which earns 
interest.  When the DROP period ends, officers exit the agency, receive a lump-sum payment 
from the DROP accumulations, and begin to draw their regular retirement benefits.6 
 Some agencies offer a buy-back option.  This benefit allows employees to cash in unused 
leave or swap those hours for annual leave or personal holidays.  Sometimes, there might be a 
ceiling or maximum number of hours an employee can transfer.  Agencies that offer such a 
program are coded as 1 and a zero value is reserved for departments that do not make such an 
opportunity available to employees.7  
 The fourth variable reflects whether an agency rewards veteran officers with seniority or 
longevity pay.  Longevity pay refers to a stipend or bonus that is added to the regular paycheck 
after an officer serves for a set number of years.  The actual number of years needed to reach this 
threshold and the size of the stipend may vary from one agency to the next.8 
Some agencies have instituted a shift differential supplement.  Officers who work 
undesirable hours, such as the midnight shift or weekends, receive a bonus for staffing these 
assignments.  Because the actual amounts may vary from one agency to the next, this variable is 
recorded as simply the presence (coded as 1) or absence (coded as 0) of such a plan.9  
Finally, a dichotomous variable indicated whether an agency had a reimbursement plan 
for officers who enroll in college courses in their spare time.  While the exact details may depend 
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upon the nature of the courses and the final course grade, any employer support is signified by a 
value of one.10 
Table 1 summarizes the dependent variables for each year and for the entire series.  The 
salary figures exhibit a general upward trend over this time frame.  However, consistent with the 
broader deteriorating economic conditions, entry-level payroll figures displayed a negligible gain 
in 2007, followed by a drop in 2008 and then a slight rebound in 2009.  The availability of a 
DROP option for retirees climbed during the study period, starting with a base of 38% in 2000 
and ending with two-thirds of the agencies providing such a benefit in 2009.  The buy-back 
benefit whereby employees can cash in or restructure unused leave shows very little change.  
Likewise, longevity pay, shift differential pay, and tuition reimbursement show very limited 
variability over the ten-year study period. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Independent Variables 
The independent variables selected for inclusion in the current study mirror the predictors 
that appear in Doerner and Doerner (2010).  These variables reflect agency characteristics and 
local economic conditions.  Agency characteristics include union status, the length of time a 
union was in place, and sworn size.11  Two additional agency traits that Doerner and Doerner 
(2010) did not include, accreditation status and violent crime rate, are incorporated into the 
current study.  Local economic conditions are represented by the unemployment rate and median 
household income.12 
The CJAP survey contains one question designed to tap union activity.  It reads, “Does 
your agency belong to a collective bargaining unit (Police Benevolent Association [PBA], 
Fraternal Order of Police [FOP], etc.) for sworn personnel?”  Agencies that respond in the 
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affirmative are coded as being unionized.  Occasionally, agency representatives would fail to 
answer the CJAP item.  If an annual series is interrupted by a missing value, that cell is 
converted to the dominant value in the sequence.  Other discrepancies are resolved by cross-
referencing records maintained by the Florida Public Employees Relations Commission (PERC).  
PERC is the state regulatory agency that monitors public employee bargaining units, certifies 
union election outcomes, and handles allegations of unfair labor practices.   
A related consideration that Doerner and Doerner (2010) probed was the length of time 
that a union was in place.  They found that substantial gains do not materialize immediately after 
PERC certifies a labor organization as the lawful representative in contract negotiations.  Instead, 
salary demands appear to be the most visible issue that unions pursue in their formative years.  
As unions gain a foothold and their tenure increases, collective bargaining officials branch out 
and address allied job concerns, especially in larger agencies.  The present study entertained the 
notion of including the number of years a collective bargaining agent conducted business.  
However, two concerns derailed this strategy.  First, although Florida municipal police 
departments began unionizing in 1968 (Pynes & Corley, 2006), the current study is able to track 
union status only from 2000 onward.  This 32-year gap means that it is not possible to monitor 
union activity as these labor groups matured.  Second, only 100 agencies became unionized 
during the study period.13  This timing makes it difficult to assess the benefits these newer unions 
reaped from neighboring chapters and statewide labor organizations.14  As a result, the reluctant 
decision was to sidestep these thorny issues and not include union tenure.    
Previous researchers have found that sworn size, the number of full-time certified officers 
an agency employs, sometimes emerges as a significant, but very modest, predictor of job 
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benefits (Briggs et al., 2008; Doerner & Doerner, 2010; Wilson et al., 2006; Zhao & Lovrich, 
1997).  Those counts are derived from CJAP and there are no missing observations. 
Florida has developed its own state accreditation body.  The Commission for Florida Law 
Enforcement, Inc. (CFA) is modeled after the national Commission on Accreditation for Law 
Enforcement Agencies (CALEA).  The ostensible purpose of accreditation is to foster increased 
professionalism by prompting agencies to adopt current “best practices” in the field.  However, 
many smaller agencies are reluctant to participate in the CALEA process because they believe it 
is too expensive, too time-consuming, and insensitive to local needs (Doerner & Doerner, 2009).  
As a result, the Legislature directed the Florida Sheriffs’ Association and the Florida Police 
Chiefs’ Association to produce a more palatable state version.  CFA became operational in 1997 
and continues to attract participants throughout the state (Doerner & Doerner, 2009), even 
though the exact benefits of accreditation remain amorphous and unsubstantiated (Doerner & 
Doerner, 2012).  The inclusion of this Florida-based indicator enables the present researchers to 
explore yet another feature of this law enforcement professionalization movement.15 
The local violent crime rate per 10,000 inhabitants, as reported by FDLE in the annual 
state version of the UCR, is added to the current study.  The expectation is that areas exhibiting 
relatively higher violent crime rates would find it necessary to extend more attractive job benefits 
to counter the more perilous duty that officers encounter.16   
Prior studies that examine police unionization have included the unemployment rate and 
median household income to gauge local fiscal capacity (Briggs et al., 2008; Doerner & Doerner, 
2010; Wilson et al., 2006).  The thinking is that governments blessed with an abundance of 
resources at their disposal are in a better position to attract more qualified personnel and do so by 
offering attractive salaries and fringe benefits.  Unfortunately, such annual information is not 
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readily available for relatively small geographical units.  For example, the figures contained in 
the annual U.S. Census Bureau’s Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates series and the yearly 
Florida Statistical Abstract (Bureau of Economic and Business Research) are limited to 
jurisdictions that have at least 25,000 inhabitants.  If such a restriction were put into place in the 
current study, that decision would levy a huge toll on the data set.  More succinctly, 73% or 178 
of the 244 cities in the study group fall below the 25,000 population threshold in 2009 and, thus, 
would be eliminated from the analysis.  One alternative to the lack of information regarding city 
economic climate is to substitute the corresponding county data in lieu of actual city values.  
While such approach does invite some error, its influence does not appear to be unduly large.17  
Thus, there appears to be reasonable empirical support to proceed in this manner.  The median 
county household income, expressed in 2009 real dollars, is substituted for a municipal measure 
for the same reason.18 
Table 2 displays summary statistics for the independent variables.  Unionization did not 
gain many footholds during the study period.  Fifty-eight percent of the Florida municipal police 
departments came under a CBA in 2000.  That figure inched up to 64% by the end of the decade.  
The typical Florida police agency employs well under 100 sworn members, demonstrating the 
sensitivity of the CJAP collection to the issue of agency size and the need to expand beyond a 
LEMAS database.  While one-third of the departments had gained accreditation by the end of the 
decade, the trend in FCA approval peaked and then leveled off in 2006.  The overall crime rate 
exhibits a downward trend over this time period.  Both the unemployment rate and the median 
household income contain bounces, with pronounced changes at the end of the decade. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Model 
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The previous discussion suggests that police officers unionize because the perception is 
that collective bargaining will result in higher salaries and better fringe benefits.  Drawing from 
Doerner and Doerner (2010), this relationship is expressed simply as: 
Benefitit = ait + β1 * Unionit + β2 * Controlsit + Pi + Tt + єit     (1) 
where subscript i refers to the particular law enforcement agency and t to the year.  If a police 
department has a certified union in place during a particular year, then Union takes a value of 
one and its estimated coefficient is assumed positive.  The vector Controls houses other 
independent variables (sworn size, median household income, unemployment rate, accreditation, 
and the violent crime rate).  Additional heterogeneity is controlled between police departments 
with P and across years by T. 
Results 
Table 3 summarizes a series of zero-order annual comparisons that pit unionized against 
non-unionized agencies.  Difference-of-means tests indicate that unionized police departments 
record significantly higher entry-level salaries in every year of the study period.  The same 
pattern emerges when the focus turns to shift differential pay and tuition reimbursement.  
Agencies with a CBA report significant gains in these areas.  Longevity pay demonstrates a 
similar propensity.  However, these patterns are not as pronounced when examining DROP 
retirement options and buy-back provisions.  Overall, unions prevail in 51 of the 60 comparisons 
for an 85% rate.  In other words, collective bargaining is accompanied by significantly higher 
salaries and better job benefits at the zero-order.  Whether these significant differences stem 
from unionization or from other variables becomes the focus of attention in the ensuing 
multivariate analyses. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
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Table 4 summarizes the results from the fixed-effects analyses for each of the six 
dependent variables.  The most notable observation is that the pronounced impact of unionization 
observed at the zero-order level vanishes when control variables are introduced.  In other words, 
collective bargaining does not appear to be responsible for the gains in starting salaries, DROP, 
buy-back provisions, longevity pay, shift differential pay, nor tuition reimbursement practices. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 The only other variables that attain significance in the equations are the unemployment 
rate, median household income, and the year trend.19  The likelihood of gaining a DROP option 
increases by 17% as unemployment declines and the availability of a tuition reimbursement plan 
increases by 37%.  The only other significant predictor, household income, portends a small 
change in the ability to offer a shift differential pay plan.  The year trend, which takes on values 
as year takes on the values 2000, 2001, 2002, and so forth, suggests that several factors change 
over time. 20  For example, entry-level salaries increase every year by a real constant dollar 
amount of $413 and certain benefits (like a DROP option, shift differential pay, and tuition 
reimbursement) become more prevalent over time. 
Discussion 
 At first blush, unionization gave the impression that it produced a clear positive impact 
on starting salaries and the other job benefits.  However, that apparent influence waned with the 
introduction of control variables.  The multivariate results suggest that police unions are able to 
gain substantial concessions when general economic conditions are favorable.  The recent 
economic downturn, though, has squeezed revenue streams and restricted the funds available for 
upcoming budgets.  Among other things, the precipitous decline in the housing market, the 
looming mortgage foreclosure crisis, and elevated unemployment rates have diminished the 
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collection of local tax receipts.  This dire situation has governmental leaders scrambling to find 
ways to deliver services while balancing local budgets.  The pursuit of diametrically opposed 
options has led to an ensuing scrum between politicians and public employee unions. 
 A number of Florida municipalities have tried to cope with these pressing woes by 
instituting layoffs, furloughs, and demanding other employee concessions.  While the measures 
analyzed in the current paper do not reflect these activities, police unions have lobbied 
vigorously on behalf of their members.  For example, the Miami FOP chapter resisted demands 
from city officials to give up $12 million in contracted benefits (Litz & Campbell, 2011), but did 
negotiate a minimal across-the-board pay cut as a way to avoid laying off 118 officers (Mazzei, 
2012).  Unions have also forced other locales to spare employees from the cutting block and, 
instead, seek other creative arrangements.  Closing substations, curtailing applicant background 
checks for businesses, shortening operating hours for public records and other non-essential 
services, restricting take-home car practices, and adopting other belt-tightening measures have 
been some of the financial alternatives municipalities have pursued (Boukari, 2011; No Author, 
2011; Port St. Lucie Police Department, 2012; Wyman, 2011). 
 Relying upon panel data is both a strength and a weakness for the current investigation.  
While it is hard to dispute that a panel analysis offers many advantages, selection of the 2000–09 
study period presents some definite challenges.  First, the information used to construct the 
dependent variables does not exist prior to 2000 for all the municipalities in Florida.  Second, a 
systematic database that tracks prior union certification and decertification elections does not 
exist and the limited information which is available is marred by inadequate record-keeping.  
Third, only 15% of the agencies covered by a CBA in the study group gained union status during 
the relevant time frame.  The remaining 85% became organized at some point between 1968 and 
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1999.  Our hunch is that newly-formed unions focus on salary gains and then branch out into 
other areas as they mature.  Unfortunately, the absence of any definitive temporal data precludes 
an examination of what happens as police unions grow and move through various stages.  
Finally, unionized agencies do not exist in a vacuum.  When an agency gains certification, it 
joins a network of similarly situated organizations.  This umbrella allows newcomers access to 
an inventory of proven and unsuccessful strategies which enables new generations to pursue 
more sophisticated bargaining strategies without duplicating past mistakes. 
 This might be an appropriate time to chart a broader research agenda concerning police 
unions.  First, the existing literature tends to focus on tangible economic benefits.  Yet, as Wilson 
and Buckler (2010) demonstrate, police unions have the potential to encourage, block, or even 
dictate organizational reform and the format any changes may take. 
Second, very little is known about the career patterns of union officials.  Local unions are 
affiliated with regional chapters which, in turn, are tied to state groups that are linked with 
national organizations.  How incumbents traverse those paths and the activities they undertake 
along the way have yet to gain attention from researchers.  Finally, unions have become more 
adept at wielding political acumen.  How various lobbying strategies are coordinated, the 
influence they exert, and whether these efforts are productive pose interesting terrain. 
Conclusion 
 Union activity in the law enforcement sector has undergone radical change in little more 
than a decade.  For example, Florida recently granted sheriff deputies the right to engage in 
collective bargaining, even though municipal police officers had possessed the same right for 
several decades.  Despite these developments, many academicians have overlooked the 
opportunity to study the growth of unionization.  Part of that omission stems from the dearth of 
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administrative data on law enforcement organizations.  National surveys were virtually non-
existent until the 1990s and statewide surveys only began cropping up at the turn of the century.  
Law enforcement institutions must confront the realization that skillfully constructed datasets 
offer much more valuable insights than do summary statistics printed in glossy annual reports.  
As agencies standardize their formats and consistently track themselves over time, panel 
analyses will become increasingly richer and able to address issues like the ones this paper 
raises.   
The results of this study suggest that unionization has a limited effect on salaries and 
other fringe job benefits when all agencies are utilized, regardless of size.  It is not clear, though, 
whether this finding is a consequence of including agencies that have been unionized for many 
years, an artifact of the collective bargaining process needing more time to generate a significant 
effect in newly unionized agencies, an indication that particular union chapters are less effective, 
or evidence that the purpose of collective bargaining units has changed over time.  The Florida 
story about collective bargaining has been explored from the perspective of sheriff deputies and, 
now, municipal police officers.  We invite other researchers to advance the issues raised here 
while carefully noting state-specific laws or institutional details that could hinder the 
generalizability of results.  
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Notes 
 
1. The 2000 Florida Legislature enacted special bills to permit collective bargaining 
representation in the Broward, Charlotte, Escambia, Jacksonville, Miami-Dade, and Volusia 
SOs.  Additional legislation in 2001 granted similar privileges to the Flagler, Monroe, and 
Nassau SOs.  Doerner and Doerner (2010) wisely excluded these nine agencies from their 
analysis because the Coastal Florida PBA decision could have no possible impact on these 
departments. 
 
2. DiPasquale and Wheaton (1992) introduced the idea of connecting four related events into a 
single, four-quadrant model while examining real estate markets.  Here, we adapt their model 
to the topic of police unionization. 
 
3. The original plan was to include four more dependent variables in the current study.  Those 
indicators included the number of paid holidays, personal days, sick days, and vacation days 
granted to employees.  However, these data were riddled with missing information.  The 
number of absent observations for each variable was 69, 152, 162, and 223, respectively.  
FDLE apparently took steps to address this issue because none of these variables exhibited 
any missing data in the 2007, 2008, and 2009 reports.  However, the decision was made to 
refrain from looking at these variables because the missing values were concentrated in the 
first seven years of the series, effectively truncating the study period to just the last three 
years of the series. 
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4. Nominal starting salary is reported.  Values in the analysis are converted to real 2009 dollars 
using the annual non-seasonally adjusted consumer price index (CPI) for all Urban 
Consumers in the South urban area as reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). 
 
5. A total of 23 observations out of a possible 2,370 salary data points were missing.  Following 
the lead of Doerner and Doerner (2010), the absent entries were converted into usable data by 
averaging the reported salaries from the preceding year and the subsequent year. 
 
6. There were 48 instances in which DROP observations were not available.  All these missing 
values were reconciled by converting them into the regularly occurring values in the ongoing 
series. 
 
7. Missing values for buy-backs existed in 45 cases and these were converted according to the 
pattern observed in a series of ongoing values.  However, 14 cases could not be resolved 
because they exhibited opposing values in the year prior to and in the year after the errant 
case.  They are treated as unusable or missing data. 
 
8. The original longevity information contained 40 missing cases.  Because they were part of an 
identifiable ongoing series, 27 cases were converted into usable data.  That left 13 instances 
which could not be resolved satisfactorily.  They are treated as unusable or missing data. 
 
9. The researchers were able to resolve all but one of the 38 missing cases regarding a shift 
differential supplement. 
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10. There were 41 tuition reimbursement cases that exhibited missing values.  The researchers 
were able to reconcile 29 values because they were part of an ongoing series of consistent 
values.  However, 12 cases were indeterminate and remained as missing data. 
 
11. Another agency trait was pursued, but later dropped from consideration.  That variable 
dealt with the education level agencies sought in recruits.  The thinking was that agencies 
that required incoming personnel to hold a college degree would pay a premium for this 
attribute.  Unfortunately, the observed variation was insufficient to be of much utility.  
Only 11% of the agencies in the study group expected new officers to possess either a two- 
or four-year college degree. 
 
12. A thwarted effort was made to tap a standard measure of fiscal capacity that commonly 
appears in the literature.  Previous studies (Briggs et al., 2008; Wilson et al., 2006; Zhao & 
Lovrich, 1977) have analyzed the number of per capita dollars local governments expend 
on police protection.  An earlier analysis of Florida county sheriff offices attempted to 
include such a measure.  However, Doerner and Doerner (2010) had to abandon that path 
after encountering numerous obstacles with the data.  The present study met with a similar 
fate.  Although local municipalities provide the Florida Department of Financial Services 
with annual fiscal reports, the values displayed extreme fluctuations for no apparent reason 
and these instabilities could not be remedied independently. 
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13. Although Florida municipal police departments began unionizing in 1968 (Pynes & Corley, 
2006), the present study tracks union status only from 2000 onward and sets the clock at 
that point.  In addition, a handful of agencies voted to decertify or oust their current labor 
representative.  PERC will not allow these agencies to select another labor representative 
for at least one calendar year.  As a result, the tenure clock was reset for agencies that 
decertified and then re-certified another union.  Two agencies (Bunnell and Davenport) 
went through this process once, while one department (Mulberry) changed union 
representation twice.  Eight other agencies decertified completely. 
 
14. An original intent of the present study was to assess the impact of diffusion upon 
subsequent unionization.  Based upon a contagion model, one might expect proximity to an 
agency that already engages in collective bargaining would help explain the spread of 
unionization.  In other words, observing the success of neighboring departments in winning 
labor concessions would encourage non-unionized agencies to reconsider their collective 
bargaining stance.  Unfortunately, the inability to track the date when a union came into 
existence from 1968 through 2000 rendered it impossible to pursue this line of inquiry.   
 
15. There are no missing cases for the state accreditation variable. 
 
16. Two cities had missing observations for 2009.  These values were rectified by averaging 
their 2008 and 2010 violent crime rates. 
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17. The annual correlations between city (25,000+ population) and county unemployment rates 
for 2000 are .76 (n = 63), .69 for 2001 (n = 63), .58 for 2002 (n = 61), .58 for 2003 (n = 
61), .37 for 2004 (n = 60), .34 for 2005 (n = 60), .50 for 2006 (n = 59), .63 for 2007 (n = 
59), .68 for 2008 (n = 54), and .54 for 2009 (n = 54). 
 
18. Household income is adjusted for inflation in the same manner as starting salary. 
 
19. Recent criminological literature promoting panel data analysis has raised concerns about 
autocorrelation, heteroskedasticity, and unobserved heterogeneity (Worrall, 2010).  The 
current study addresses the first two worries using robust standard errors clustered on 
counties in linear panel regressions and bootstrapping in logistic panel regressions.  The 
last issue is overcome partially by using municipal-level fixed effects (and clustering 
standard errors at the county-level for cross-sectional heterogeneity) and partially with a 
year trend (for temporal heterogeneity).  If the data had permitted, the panel analysis could 
have been enriched in other ways.  For example, the economics literature has long 
suggested a simultaneous link between unions and benefits (see Ashenfelter & Johnson, 
1972).  A police organizational story might be that certain types of agencies pursue 
collective bargaining agreements because of their relative levels (or lack of) benefits.  In 
turn, the unions argue on behalf of officers and obtain more benefits.  Unfortunately, the 
data limited the current analysis in two dimensions: few newly unionized agencies and a 
short period for collective bargaining.  The first aspect is problematic because nearly all 
unionized agencies (85%) began engaging in collective bargaining prior to 2000.  The 
second dimension is tricky because collective bargaining efforts typically take multiple 
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years between union mobilization activities, contract negotiations, and achieving any 
demonstrable results.  In the future, a study that utilizes a longer panel might be in a 
position to address these ideas by regressing on simultaneous equations or salary 
differences prior to and after unionization. 
 
20. Another approach to including a year measurement is to use binary variables for each year, 
or year dummies instead of a trend.  The interpretation would change to a non-linear impact 
that can be unique in each year instead of a constant marginal effect.  Practically, one 
would expect real salary increases to be relatively similar across time when smoothed over 
labor contracts.  With the exception of the first year in the current database, this is true.  
The average real salary increase over time is $417 and a regression with the constant year 
trend returns an estimate of $413.  For these reasons, a year trend is used instead of year 
dummies.  Further results are available upon request. 
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Figure 1 
 
Relating Two Markets and Four Events 
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Figure 2 
 
Four Panels Showing an Interactive Police Labor Market 
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Figure 3 
 
Union Presence Adds New Officers and Increases Salaries 
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Figure 4 
 
Union Presence Implements a Binding Minimum Wage 
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Table 1 
Summary Statistics, Dependent Variablesa 
 
 
 
Year 
 
 
Entry 
Salary 
 
 
 
DROP 
 
 
 
Buy-Back 
 
 
Longevity 
Pay 
 
Shift 
Differential 
Pay 
 
 
Tuition 
Reimbursement 
       
2000 $33,594 .38 .60 .48 .22 .76 
2001 $34,235 .41 .59 .48 .22 .60 
2002 $35,274 .46 .63 .47 .24 .73 
2003 $35,692 .51 .62 .50 .18 .84 
2004 $35,932 .55 .67 .52 .25 .82 
2005 $36,257 .59 .64 .49 .28 .83 
2006 $36,909 .63 .69 .51 .30 .85 
2007 $37,133 .64 .59 .52 .31 .84 
2008 $36,743 .64 .65 .50 .32 .79 
2009 $37,349 .65 .65 .49 .30 .76 
       
Mean $35,912 .55 .63 .50 .26 .78 
s.d. $6,917 .50 .48 .50 .44 .41 
N 2,370 2,370 2,354 2,357 2,368 2,358 
 
a Nominal salary figures are converted to real 2009 dollars using the annual non-seasonally 
adjusted Consumer Price Index for the Southeast Region.  The remaining variables are 
dichotomous where a code of one represents the presence of a program and a code of zero 
reflects the absence of a program. 
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Table 2 
Summary Statistics, Independent Variablesa 
 
 
 
Year 
 
 
 
Union 
 
 
Sworn 
Size 
 
 
 
Accredited 
 
Violent 
Crime 
Rate 
 
 
Unemployment 
Rate 
 
Median 
HH 
Income 
       
2000 .58 65 .14 73 3.8 $46,998 
2001 .59 65 .17 76 5.0 $44,999 
2002 .59 65 .21 72 5.6 $44,546 
2003 .60 67 .24 67 5.2 $44,716 
2004 .60 67 .27 65 4.8 $45,358 
2005 .61 68 .31 72 3.8 $45,900 
2006 .61 70 .33 67 3.4 $47,480 
2007 .61 72 .33 64 4.1 $48,446 
2008 .62 73 .33 62 6.3 $46,825 
2009 .64 75 .33 57 10.6 $44,161 
       
Mean .60 69 .27 67 5.3 $45,943 
s.d. .49 126 .44 70 2.2 $6,576 
N 2,370 2,370 2,370 2,370 2,370 2,370 
 
a Nominal household income figures are converted to real 2009 dollars using the annual non-
seasonally adjusted Consumer Price Index for the Southeast Region.  The remaining variables 
are dichotomous where a code of one represents the presence of a program and a code of zero 
reflects the absence of a program. 
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Table 3 
 
Summary Table Regarding the Impact of Union Representation on Job Benefitsa 
 
 
 
 
Year 
 
 
Entry 
Salary 
 
 
 
DROP 
 
 
 
Buy-Back 
 
 
Longevity 
Pay 
 
Shift 
Differential 
Pay 
 
 
Tuition 
Reimbursement 
       
2000 +   + + + 
2001 +   + + + 
2002 + + + + + + 
2003 +   + + + 
2004 + + + + + + 
2005 + +  + + + 
2006 + +  + + + 
2007 + + + + + + 
2008 + + + + + + 
2009 + + +  + + 
 
a  A positive sign indicates that unionized agencies have a significantly higher value compared to 
non-unionized agencies when utilizing a difference-of-means test. 
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Table 4 
Fixed-Effects Panel Data Analysisa 
 
 
 
Variable 
 
 
Entry 
Salaryb 
 
 
 
DROP 
 
 
Buy-
Back 
 
 
Longevity 
Pay 
 
Shift 
Differential 
Pay 
 
 
Tuition 
Reimburse 
       
Union (1 = Yes) -0.48 
(0.44) 
-0.77 
(0.76) 
-0.52 
(0.41) 
-0.30 
(0.42) 
1.76 
(6.58) 
1.23 
(1.19) 
       
Sworn Size (log) 0.00 
(0.01) 
0.06 
(0.04) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
-0.02 
(0.01) 
0.00 
(0.02) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
       
Accredited (1 = Yes) 0.39 
(0.24) 
0.08 
(0.64) 
0.51 
(0.34) 
0.30 
(0.40) 
0.57 
(0.64) 
-0.33 
(0.63) 
       
Violent Crime Rate 0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
       
Unemployment Rate -0.07* 
(0.03) 
-0.17* 
(0.08) 
0.01 
(0.04) 
-0.04 
(0.06) 
0.00 
(0.07) 
-0.37* 
(0.07) 
       
Median HH Income -0.05 
(0.03) 
-0.13 
(0.08) 
0.02 
(0.04) 
-0.04 
(0.04) 
0.17* 
(0.07) 
-0.02 
(0.06) 
       
Year Trend 0.41* 
(0.04) 
0.51* 
(0.09) 
0.02 
(0.04) 
0.06* 
(0.04) 
0.27* 
(0.08) 
0.33* 
(0.07) 
       
Observations 2,370 1,010 1,544 1,727 669 1,028 
Agencies 237 101 156 174 67 104 
R2 within 0.29 — — — — — 
F-statistic 24.77 — — — — — 
χ2 — 51.68 6.46 4.48 25.07 32.79 
Log-likelihood -4,735 -280 -658 -563 -200 -297 
       
 
a Entry salary is a linear solution; the others are logistical solutions. 
 
b Parentheses contain standard errors.  Linear solutions are robust to serial correlation and 
heteroskedasticity and clustering at the county level.  Logistical solutions are bootstrapped using 
1,000 repetitive draws from the full sample with a seed set as 6447647. 
      
* Denotes significance at the .05 level of analysis. 
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